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ESSAY
IMPEACHING A JURY VERDICT, JUROR
MISCONDUCT, AND RELATED ISSUES:
A VIEW FROM THE BENCH
THE HONORABLE DENISE M. O'MALLEY*

I.

INTRODUCTION

After a lengthy jury trial, a judge is frequently presented with
a motion for a new trial alleging that the misconduct of the jurors
corrupted the verdict or that some extraneous, prejudicial
influence has reached the jurors during trial or deliberation. This
Article explores the most commonly encountered situations
involving juror misconduct or extraneous influences. It further
provides an examination of relevant Illinois case law as well as
law from other jurisdictions, primarily federal, which addresses
these issues. Finally, this Article identifies certain problem areas
in applying the law from a judge's perspective.
II.

WHAT CONSTITUTES JUROR MISCONDUCT OR

PREJUDICIAL INFLUENCE?
A review of the case law shows that jurors' conduct, which
potentially deprives the parties of a fair trial, generally falls into
two broad categories.
The first category consists of those
situations in which jurors indulge in what is called "irregular
conduct."
Such "irregular conduct" frequently includes
unauthorized juror visits to the scene involved in the trial,
personal investigation by jurors or testing of evidence that may or
may not have been presented at trial. "Irregular conduct" may
also consist of juror consultation of reference materials, such as
books, almanacs, and dictionaries,' or coercion or pressure on an
* The Honorable Judge Denise Margaret O'Malley currently presides on
the bench of the Circuit Court of Cook County, State of Illinois. Judge
O'Malley graduated from Mundelein College in 1961 and received her M.A.
degree in clinical social work from the University of Chicago in 1971. She
earned her J.D. from The John Marshall Law School in 1981.
1. See generally People v. Holmes, 372 N.E.2d 656, 658-59 (Ill. 1978)
(describing a jury that went to Florsheim Shoe Store to inspect heels of shoes
after shoe-print was discussed at trial); Templeton v. Chicago & North-
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individual juror beyond the normal tensions generated when
twelve diverse people attempt to reach a consensus.2 The last type
of "irregular conduct" includes cases that reflect simple confusion
in the application of complex jury instructions or verdict forms,
resulting in a verdict that does not accurately reflect the jury's
intended decision. 3
The second category of juror misconduct cases discussed in
this Article comprises situations where extraneous and potentially
prejudicial information reaches the jury and affects the verdict.
The parties often claim that the source of such contamination is a
remark of the trial judge or bailiff during the trial proceedings.4 A
smaller number of cases deal with outside influences in the form of
threats, advice, or information pertinent to a significant issue in
the trial that reaches the jury from an outside source. 5
In whatever way the jury verdict is alleged to be tainted,
motions for a new trial based upon such issues are virtually
always supported by the affidavits and/or testimony of the jurors
who reached the verdict in question, or others who had
conversations with them. In Illinois, the admissibility of this
evidence is judged by the application of the 1978 Illinois Supreme

western Transp. Co., 628 N.E.2d 442, 449 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (explaining how
a jury brought a book on financial management into jury room); Birch v.
Township of Drummer, 487 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (discussing
evidence that jury went to scene to inspect allegedly dangerous curve).
2. See generally People v. Reid, 583 N.E.2d 1, 1-2 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), app.
den., 591 N.E.2d 29, 29 (Ill. 1992) (relating how a juror received a threatening
phone call while sequestered); United States v. Kohne, 358 F. Supp. 1046,
1049 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (detailing how a holdout juror was told that if the jury
had to be sequestered one more night, the speaker would be in court charged
with murder); People v. Keenan, 758 P.2d 1081, 1120-21 (Cal. 1988)
(describing a male juror who threatened to kill an elderly female juror); People
v. Jacobson, 440 N.Y.S.2d 458, 464 (N.Y. Trial Term 1981) (discussing a juror
who threw a chair).
3. See generally Chalmers v. City of Chicago, 431 N.E.2d 361, 364-65 (Ill.
1982) (dealing with a jury confused over use of a verdict form); Taylor v. R.D.
Morgan & Assocs., 563 N.E.2d 1186, 1193-94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (involving
jury's misunderstanding ofjury instructions).
4. See generally People v. Green, 415 N.E.2d 595, 595 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(analyzing the behavior of a judge who improperly asked for the numerical
decision of jury, gave a non-standard jury instruction, and refused to grant a
mistrial after 11 hours of deliberation and a statement by the jury that they
were deadlocked); Hunter v. Smallwood, 328 N.E.2d 344, 344 (Ill. App. Ct.
1975) (discussing a trial judge who refused to answer a jury question); Sanders
v. City of Chicago, 91-L-7200 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, 1991) (Order 1-96-0780
denying leave to appeal) (involving a bailiff who told the deliberating jury that
they would reach a verdict).
5. See generally Reid, 583 N.E.2d at 1 (discussing a holdout juror who
received a threatening anonymous phone call while sequestered); Keenan, 758
P.2d at 1081 (analyzing the impropriety of a male juror who threatened to kill
an elderly female holdout juror).
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Court case People v. Holmes.!

III. THE GUIDELINES IN ILLINOIS: PEOPLE V. HOLMES
Since 1978, virtually every Illinois decision concerned with
juror misconduct, civil or criminal, has cited People v. Holmes! In
Holmes, the jury convicted the defendant of attempted armed
robbery and the court sentenced him to the penitentiary.' The
appellate court affirmed the conviction' and the supreme court
granted the defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 10 The
defendant contended that the circuit and appellate courts had
erred in failing to consider an affidavit that supported his motion
for a new trial." The affidavit alleged that jury members had
conducted their own investigation of critical evidence."
Testimony at trial showed that there was snow on the ground
at the time of the attempted robbery, and the victim identified
shoe prints that she claimed were made by her assailant." The
arresting officer then required that the defendant make shoe
prints in the snow for comparison. 4 At trial, the arresting officer
testified that: defendant's left shoe print matched the one in the
snow; a crack extended from the brand name "logo" towards the
corner of the heel; and the insignia "Florsheim" appeared in the
heel of each shoe print."
The defendant's attorney submitted an affidavit supporting
the defendant's motion for a new trial." The affidavit stated that
after the trial, in a conversation with members of the jury and in
the presence of an Assistant State's Attorney, a juror told the
defendant's attorney that during the trial, several jurors had gone
to a Florsheim Shoe Store and looked at the bottoms of various
shoes to examine the Florsheim insignia. 7 The juror further
stated that they observed two kinds of designs, one containing a
crack or line, and another containing the "Florsheim" logo. 8 The
jurors discussed this inspection during deliberations."
In deciding the defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial
court concluded that it was precluded from considering the
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

372 N.E.2d 656, 656 (Ill.
1978).
Id. at 656.
Id. at 657.
People v. Holmes, 354 N.E.2d 611, 614 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1976).
Holmes, 372 N.E.2d at 657.
Id.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Holmes, 372 N.E.2d at 657.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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allegations contained in the supporting affidavit on the grounds
that to do so would permit the defendant to improperly impeach
the jury's verdict." The appellate court affirmed, both courts
apparently relying on People v. Stacey, cited in Holmes,"' which
stated that in Illinois, it has long been the rule that the jury
cannot impeach its verdict by either affidavit or testimony.22
The Holmes court noted that Professor Wigmore traced the
origin of this rule to the decision of Lord Mansfield in Vaise v.
Delaval.' In looking at juror affidavits in general, the Holmes
court stated that its review of authority showed that there are two
categories in which parties offer the testimony or affidavit of a
juror to impeach a jury verdict.? In the first category, a party
offers a juror's testimony or affidavit to demonstrate the "motive,

method or process by which the jury reache[s] its verdict."25 Courts
have, almost without exception, held such testimony or affidavit
inadmissible. In the second category, a party offers the testimony
or affidavit of a juror to show conditions or events brought to the
attention of the jury without any attempt to ascertain its effects on
the jury's deliberations or mental processes. 26
In most
jurisdictions, courts hold such proof to be admissible.
Examining the reasoning for distinguishing the two types of
affidavits, the Holmes court relied on the rationale articulated by
Justice William J. Brennan, then sitting on the New Jersey
Supreme Court:
[tihe better reasoned decisions support the exclusion of jurors'
20. Holmes, 372 N.E.2d at 657.
21. Id. at 658 (quoting the appellate court's opinion in Holmes, 354 N.E.2d
611, 621 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) and citing People v. Stacey, 184 N.E.2d 866 (Ill.
1962) (ascertaining whether the additional investigation had improperly
influenced the jury's verdict)).
22. Holmes, 372 N.E.2d at 658.
23. Id. at 658-59 (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
§ 2352 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (citing Vaise v. Delaval (KB. 1785)
1 Term. R. 11)). The rule, however, had been somewhat inconsistently applied
in Illinois. As early as the July term of 1820, the Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed a trial judge who granted a new trial on the basis of an affidavit of
one of the jurors. Sawyer v. Stephenson, 1 Ill. 24 (1820). That affidavit stated
that, during deliberations, another juror offered new testimony that had not
been offered at trial. Id. Because of the testimony, the affiant was induced to
render a verdict for the plaintiff although he would not have been inclined to
do so otherwise. Id. While the 1820 Illinois Supreme Court clearly accepted
the affidavit which went directly to the mental processes of the jury as
competent evidence, later cases held exactly the opposite, making no mention
of the Sawyer case. Martin v. Ehrenfels, 24 Ill. 187, 189 (1860); Reins v.
People, 30 Ill. 256, 274 (1863); Wykoff v. Chicago City R.R. Co., 85 N.E. 237
(Ill. 1908). These later decisions, the Holmes court critically commented, were
supported by "neither reasoning [n]or authority." Holmes, 372 N.E.2d at 657.
24. Holmes, 372 N.E.2d at 658.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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testimony as to their mental processes, not upon the discredited
basis of the policies against self-stultification and avoidance of jury
tampering, perjury or other fraudulent practices, but upon the
sounder ground that, being personal to each juror, the working of
the mind of any of them cannot be subjected to the test of other
testimony, and therefore that such testimony should not be received
to overthrow the verdict to which all assented.2
Justice Brennan noted alternatively that
[wlhere, however, jurors' testimony goes, not to the motives or
methods or processes by which they reach the verdict, but merely to
the existence of conditions or the occurrence of events bearing upon
the verdict, the basis of policy does not exist, and this whether the
condition happens or the event occurs in or outside of the jury room.
Evidence of the actual effect of the extraneous matter upon jurors'
minds can and should be excluded, as such evidence implicates their
mental processes, but receiving their evidence as to the existence of
the condition or happening of the event, particularly when the
consequences are governed according to whether capacity for
adverse prejudice inheres in the condition or event itself supplies
evidence which can be put to the test of other testimony (and thus
sound policy is satisfied) and at the same time the evidence can
serve to avert, as here, a grave miscarriage of justice, which is
certainly the first duty of a court of conscience to prevent if at all
possible. 2'
American courts thus moved from a rule that completely excluded
consideration
29

of any juror affidavits or testimony to impeach a jury verdict, to a
more modified rule that admitted affidavits showing the existence of
extraneous material or outside influence in the jury room. However,
courts still held affidavits that went to the "mental processes" of the
jurors to be inadmissible. 0
In concluding its analysis, the Holmes court focused on Rule
606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence that makes an identical
distinction. The Rule provides:
(b) Inquiry into the validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an
inquiry into the validity of a verdict or an indictment, a juror may
not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the
course of the jury's deliberation or to the effect of anything upon his
or any other jurors' mind or emotions as influencing him to assent or
dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental
processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on
the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was
27. Id. at 658-59.
28. Id. (quoting State v. Kociolek, 118 A.2d 812, 816 (Ill. 1978)); 58 A.L.R.
2d 545, 552 (1955).
29. People v. Stacey, 184 N.E.2d 866, 872 (Ill. 1962).
30. Holmes, 372 N.E.2d at 659.
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improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside
influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror. Nor may a
juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning
a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying
be received for those purposes.
The notes to the Committee on the Judiciary, House Report
No. 93-650, succinctly stated the above distinction.
The
Committee candidly said, "[t]he jurors are the persons who know
what really happened. Allowing them to testify as to matters
other than their own reaction involves no particular hazard to the
value sought to be protected." 2
The foregoing reasoning
persuaded the Illinois Supreme Court that a juror should be
permitted to testify whether extraneous information improperly
brought before the jury prejudiced jurors, or whether outside
influences persuaded jurors.33 Applying this reasoning to the facts
in Holmes, the court concluded that the issue of identification of
the shoe was critical and that the private investigation conducted
by the jurors introduced unfair prejudice.4 The trial judge's
failure to consider the affidavit regarding the extraneous
investigation was held to be reversible error; consequently, the
reviewing court remanded the case.35
IV. THE LAW IN ILLINOIS AFTER HOLMES

Since Holmes,' Illinois courts have heard a variety of cases
concerning juror misconduct and extraneous influences. The first,
Heaver v. Ward,37 decided by the Second District only one year
after Holmes, resulted in a remand for a new trial based on two
common types of improper jury activity: unauthorized visits to the
scene and use of reference materials.'
In Heaver, the plaintiff sued the defendant for injuries
received in an automobile accident. 9 After a verdict in favor of the
defendant, the trial court learned that jury members had gone to
the scene and brought a copy of Rules of the Road into the jury
room during deliberations. 0 An evidentiary hearing confirmed
that this conduct had occurred." The trial court refused to certify
the transcript of the proceedings of the evidentiary hearing and
31. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
32. Holmes, 372 N.E.2d at 660 (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 93-650 (1973)).
33. Id.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Id. at 662.
Id.
Id. at 656.
386 N.E.2d 134, 134 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
Id. at 139.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 138-39.
Id. at 136.
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denied a motion for a new trial.42 The appellate court found error
on both grounds, quoting with approval from Daniels v. Barker,' a
1938 New Hampshire case: "[w]hen incompetent evidence which
may be prejudicial is received, the verdict is set aside, without
proof that the jury gave it any weight in reaching the verdict. To
require the losing party to prove the actual prejudice would place a
difficult and unjust burden on him.""
This position was not in conflict with the frequently cited rule
of People v. Mills,4 5 that "a jury verdict will not be set aside where
it is apparent that no injury or prejudice resulted from a
communication to the jury either by the court or by third persons
outside the presence of the defendant."4 The court reasoned that
with the conflicting testimony of jurors in Heaver, and the lack of
clarity as to exactly which section of the Rules of the Road the
jurors had discussed, the defendant was unable to show that no
prejudice occurred.47
Subsequently, the Third and Fourth District Appellate Courts
considered two cases involving unauthorized visits to the scenes of
accidents. Both courts applied Holmes with different results. In
the first, Brown v. Johnson,4 a plaintiff-motorcyclist sued an
automobile driver and his employer to recover for injuries
sustained in a collision. 49 For reasons not set forth in the opinion,
the day after the trial, with the permission of the court and in the
presence of a court reporter, the plaintiffs attorney interviewed
one of the jurors.' The attorney asked the juror his opinion on the
credibility of a key defense witness. 5' That witness had testified
that, while he stood in an electronics store, he looked out the
window and saw the plaintiffs motorcycle go by at high speed.5"
The juror replied that he believed the witness to be credible since
another juror visited the scene and looked out the same window,
telling his fellow jurors that, since the block was short, that
position provided a view.' In another conversation, the same juror
revealed that perhaps two or three other jury members had also
visited the scene.'
The trial court later held an evidentiary hearing in which all

42. Heaver, 386 N.E.2d at 136.
43. 200

A. 410, 410 (N.H. 1938).

44. Id. at 415.
45. 237 N.E.2d 697, 703 (IM. 1968).
46. Heaver, 386 N.E.2d at 139.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
416 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1981).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Brown, 416 N.E.2d at 801.
Id.
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the jurors questioned at the hearing denied making an
unauthorized visit to the scene and/or looking out the window. 5 In
contrast to his earlier statement, the juror who provided the initial
information stated tentatively at the hearing that he "may have
heard somebody had visited the scene."16 The juror excused his
lack of memory by saying that this occurred approximately two
years ago and he had no specific knowledge as to which juror
visited the scene.57 The trial court denied the plaintiffs motion
without considering either the substance of the affidavit or the
statement.4
The appellate court reversed stating, "[n]either the trial court
nor this court need attempt to delve into the exact effect of
unauthorized evidence on a particular juror. It is enough that the
unauthorized evidence directly related to the issues in the case
and may have improperly influenced the verdict." 9 The opinion is
not clear as to how the appellate court decided that the first
conversation with the juror was credible while the second was not,
or the reasons for the two-year time lapse between the trial and
the evidentiary hearing.
In Birch v. Township of Drummer, the Illinois Appellate6
Court reached a different conclusion while still applying Holmes. 0
In Birch, the estate of a driver killed in a two-car collision brought
an action against the Township of Drummer and its Highway
Commissioner, alleging that they had been negligent in failing to
warn of a dangerous roadway condition.6 ' During the course of
deliberations, two jurors went to the scene to inspect this allegedly
dangerous curve.62
After a verdict for the defendants, the plaintiff brought a
motion for a new trial supported by the statements of jurors
attesting to the unauthorized visits to the scene. 3 Citing Holmes,
the court concluded that it could properly consider these
statements, since they simply showed that the jurors had
conducted an independent investigation without making any effort
to relate this action to the jurors' mental processes.'
Nonetheless, the trial court denied plaintiffs motion, and the
judgment was affirmed.' The appellate court distinguished Brown
by stating:
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Brown, 416 N.E.2d at 802.
Id. at 803 (quoting Heaver v. Ward, 386 N.E.2d 134, 139 (1979)).
487 N.E.2d 798, 808 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
Id. at 801.
Id. at 806.
Id.
Id. at 807.
Birch, 487 N.E.2d at 808.
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[u]nlike Brown, the plaintiff here does not allege the intersection
had changed since the accident. Both parties presented their own
plan and profile of the intersection and a number of photographs of
the accident scene. A verdict in a civil case ordinarily need not be
set aside because the jurors made an unauthorized visit to the scene
of the accident where the visit disclosed nothing about the location
not accurately depicted by photographs, maps, diagrams, or the like
lawfully admitted into evidence (Annot. 11 A.L.R. 3d 918, 945
(1967)).
When maps and photographs lawfully admitted into
evidence correctly depict the area, the Prevailing party has met its
burden of proving the lack of prejudice.
The Birch court noted that while the physical characteristics of the
scene were crucial to the outcome of the case, they were not in
dispute. 7
Illinois cases also address juror misconduct in connection with
jury consultation of outside reference materials. The holdings of
these cases differ, depending upon the circumstances and the
reasoning of the appellate court involved. In Frede v. Downs, the
appellate court set aside the jury verdict after the circuit court
chose not to do so.' The plaintiff, injured in a boating accident,
maintained a right to a new trial because the jury consulted a book
entitled Piloting, Seamanship and Small Boat Handling during
deliberations.69
After the trial court reconvened the jury, it followed the
precedent set forth in Holmes and only questioned the jurors on
their use of the book-not as to the book's effect on their decisionmaking.
One juror stated he looked at the entire book, while
most of the others only glanced at it, or looked at pictures. 7' The
sections most frequently looked at were those involving "right-ofway," responsibilities of the skipper, and Rules of the Road for
boats.72 All of these issues proved vital to the case. In reversing,
3
the appellate court cited Heaver v. Ward"
and stated:
[w]e believe that the circumstances of the case at bar require a
reversal of the judgment and a remandment because there was a
66. Id. at 807 (citing Newton v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 243 N.W. 684
(Minn. 1932)).
67. The fact that the plaintiff had apparently not properly preserved the
issue for appeal created an additional problem, and the only support of the
motion consisted of a statement from the trial judge as to what the jurors told
him. Birch, 487 N.E.2d at 808. The reviewing court held this failure to be
insufficient. Id. "The rights of litigants in a court of record cannot be left to
the mercy of private remarks in the Judge's ear." Id. (quoting Loucks v.
Pierce, 93 N.E.2d 372, 374 (Ill. App. Ct. 1950)).
68. 428 N.E.2d 1035, 1036-38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
69. Id. at 1037.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 386 N.E.2d 134 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
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requisite showing of the probability of prejudice. As in Holmes the
extraneous information that was improperly brought to the jury's
attention was in the nature of evidence appearing on a crucial
question, that is the alleged negligence of Downs in failing to keep a
proper lookout. Frede had not been confronted with nor given any
opportunity to refute what the jurors may have looked at in the
book. In determining whether Downs was keeping a proper lookout
the jury was instructed that Downs had the duty to exercise
ordinary care to avoid a collision and also that in making that
determination they should consider the statutes on the right-of-way.
The extent to which the jury read the book is not certain. They did,
however, read the rules of the road for boats and the duties of a
skipper which relate to this issue of a proper lookout. This may
have improperly influenced the verdict.74
The probability of prejudice mandated a reversal in Haite v.
Aldridge Electric, a car-truck collision case, where affidavits
supporting a motion for a new trial showed that a juror consulted
an almanac to ascertain the time of sunset on the day in
question.75 Visibility was a key issue in the case. 76 Applying
Holmes, the court refused to consider the effect of the almanac
evidence on the jurors' decision, but did examine the "nature" of
the evidence." Further refining the holding in Holmes, the court
stated:
[h]ere it is obvious that the almanac evidence as to the time of
sunset on the day of the accident related directly to a crucial issue in
the case-visibility. The burden then shifted to defendants to
demonstrate that no injury or prejudice resulted. We do not believe
that this burden has clearly been met.78
The court rejected the defendant's argument that evidence
regarding visibility had been introduced at trial, stating the trial
evidence was conflicting.9
In People v. Szymanski, the jury convicted the defendant of
forgery.80 Prior to sentencing, the defense submitted a motion for a
new trial supported by four signed handwritten statements of
jurors, one of which was notarized."' The statements, in effect,
said that one of the women on the jury simply appointed herself
foreperson."
The foreperson told the jury that she lived in the

74. Frede, 428 N.E.2d at 1037.
75. 575 N.E.2d 243, 253 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
76. Id. at 255.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Impliedly, the court felt that the jury impermissibly used the time
of sunset from the almanac to resolve conflicts in the evidence and reversed
the case. Id.
80. 589 N.E.2d 148, 149 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
81. Id. at 150.
82. Id.
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Naperville area, and drew a map to demonstrate the route that the
defendant had taken from various points in the village.' One
juror's statement claimed the map showed that the building in
question was located in a small area, and all of the jurors'
statements said that the map was inaccurate.' The affidavits also
stated that, at least at one point during deliberations, a tie existed
among the jurors regarding the defendant's guilt or innocence."
After argument on the motion, and without an evidentiary
hearing, the court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial,
holding that the "map referred to in the statements was merely an
extension of the jury foreperson's mental processes and was not
'extraneous' to the actual deliberation."'
The appellate court
affirmed, concluding that it is well established that a jury has a
right to consider evidence in the light of its own knowledge and
observations. 7
The map merely involved the juror's own
knowledge and observations regarding the scene.' The appellate
court pointed out that the juror had not made a trip to the scene
for the purpose of ascertaining the particulars of the map, but
rather drew it based on her own familiarity with the area. 9 The
appellate court further held that the trial court properly classified
the proffered affidavits regarding the use of the map as
inadmissible because they concerned the mental processes the jury
used to reach its verdict.M
An interesting case involving both reference materials and
completely conflicting affidavits is Templeton v. Chicago & North
Western Transportation Co.9' In Templeton, a railroad employee

was severely injured when he fell from a railway bridge.92 The
employee subsequently sued the railroad under the Federal
Employee's Liability Act (FELA)."3 The jury entered a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant filed a post-trial motion
arguing entitlement to a new trial because one of the jurors
brought a book entitled Instruction to Financial Management into

the jury room during deliberations.' An unsworn, handwritten
affidavit by juror Jackson, stating that it was he who provided the

83. Id. at 151.

84. Id.
85. Szymanski, 589 N.E.2d at 150-51.
86. Id. at 151.
87. Id. at 152.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Szymanski, 589 N.E.2d at 152. This case seems to represent an
expansion of what may be considered "mental processes."
91. 628 N.E.2d 442, 442 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
92. Id. at 444.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 449.
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book, supported the motion."9 The defendant further alleged that
the jurors referred to the book for assistance in deliberations."
In response to the defendant's motion, the plaintiff presented
a verified affidavit by the same juror containing a directly
contradictory statement, as well as the affidavit of a second juror,
Ross, that corroborated Jackson's second affidavit. 7 In Jackson's
new affidavit, he stated that while he brought the book into the
jury room, jurors did not look at it.98 Juror Ross further stated in
her affidavit that she neither referred to any books, nor did she
observe any other juror doing so." The court held that while the
presence of the textbook in the jury room was improper, the
plaintiff had not established injury or prejudice because the sworn
affidavit stated that no one had looked at the book.'"
Three recent Illinois cases in which jurors' use of dictionaries
did not result in reversals were Danhof v. Richland Township,0
Macias v. Cincinnati Forte, °2 and Pietrzak v. Rush-PresbyterianSt. Luke's Medical Center.'
In Danhof, the jury consulted a
dictionary for the definition of the word "proximate."' The court
held that no reversible error existed since the jurors stated at the
evidentiary hearing that they followed the trial court's
instructions, and the definition did not affect their verdict. °5
Moreover, the dictionary definition of "proximate" did not
contradict, nullify, or negate the definition contained in the
instructions. 10
In Macias, the trial court held that no error had occurred
where the jury foreperson researched and shared with the jury the
definitions of "reasonable" and "reasonable care," as well as
"defective condition," all taken from Black's Law Dictionary.7 The
appellate court decided that the definitions of "reasonable" and
"reasonable care" were essentially the same as those given in the
95. Id.
96. Templeton, 628 N.E.2d at 449.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 449.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 453-54. The holding does not address the conflict in the affidavit,
and we might assume that the court relied on the second affidavit because the
juror verified it.
101. 559 N.E.2d 1155, 1155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
102. 661 N.E.2d 472, 472 (Ill App. Ct. 1996).
103. 670 N.E.2d 1254, 1254 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
104. Danhof,559 N.E.2d at 1157.

105. Id.
106. Id. Although Holmes precludes courts from considering anything that
goes to the mental processes of the jurors, and the court in Danhof clearly
considered the jurors' testimony that the dictionary definitions did not "affect"
their verdict, there is no explanation in the opinion for this apparent
inconsistency.
107. Macias, 661 N.E.2d at 473.
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instructions and did not conflict with, or substantially differ from,
the instructions.'" Since the dictionary definitions were merely
cumulative of the definitions in the instructions, they caused the
plaintiff no prejudice."° The court never instructed the jury on the
meaning of "defective condition."10
Finally, in Pietrzak, the plaintiffs brought a medical
malpractice action against the hospital and various medical
providers on behalf of a brain-damaged patient."1 After a verdict
for the defendant, the plaintiffs filed a post-trial motion claiming
that jurors' consultation of the dictionary for the definition of
"timely" prejudiced them." 2 The plaintiff moved to introduce
testimony of a linguistics expert, discussing the possible prejudice
caused by the definition."'
The trial court denied the motion, holding that "the dictionary
definitions at issue were ordinary, neutral and non-argumentative
definitions that did not improperly influence the jury.""' The
appellate court ruled that the lower court was correct in its
decision to disallow the testimony of the linguistics expert, because
"language interpretation is a question of law for the court so that
expert linguistic testimony may be disallowed."" 5
A. Coercion
The second category of cases that involve actual misconduct
on the part of jurors is those cases where jurors coerce or pressure
one another beyond the ordinary pressure that occurs when twelve
diverse people attempt to reach a verdict. In People v. Wilson, a
juror contacted defense counsel after the trial because she feared
that the jury verdict was improper."' She informed counsel that
another juror had advised her that if she persisted in her vote of
"not guilty," defendant would be set free, would never stand trial
for the charges, and it would be her responsibility if he committed
a similar offense." 7
Her affidavit also stated that this
"misinformation" persuaded her to vote "guilty.""8 The trial court

108. Id. at 475.
109. Id.
110. Id. Nonetheless, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that the
introduction of this definition had no impact upon the jury's verdict where the
foreperson testified that after he read the definition of "defective condition" to
the jurors, no one discussed the definition, and, in fact, the jury seemed
"bored." Id.
111. 670 N.E.2d 1254, 1254 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 1256.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1259.
615 N.E.2d 1283, 1289 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993).
Id. at 1289-90.
Id. at 1290.
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denied defendant's motion, refusing to conduct a hearing, and the
appellate court affirmed the denial."9 The court held the affidavit
to be incompetent evidence because it went to the mental
processes of the juror."'
The court reached a similar result in Sale v. Allstate
Insurance Co."' The plaintiff offered an affidavit which stated in
part that the jurors misunderstood the instructions, and the
holding denying the motion seemed to address only this issue."
However, the plaintiff also claimed that one of the jurors offered
himself as foreperson, and told the other jurors after his election
that he would give them one hour to reach a verdict. 12' He insisted
that only one issue required a decision, and wanted to eliminate
all the "legalese" as well as "medicalese" and get down to basics. 1'
He instructed the jury that the standard of proof was "beyond a
reasonable doubt" despite the fact that this was a civil case and
the court had instructed the jury otherwise. 125
During
deliberations, he allegedly paced about the room in a frustrated
manner and hit the door-conduct which at least one juror found
to be intimidating. 126 While the court did not specifically address
the issue of intimidation in its holding, the court concluded that
this conduct went to the emotional state of the jury at the time
7
they reached a verdict, and thus the evidence was inadmissible.1
Similarly, in People v. Boclair, after a verdict of guilty, the
defense received an undated and unsolicited letter from juror
Vercler. " In the letter, the juror wrote that he thought the
defendant was innocent, that he had resisted a guilty verdict for as
long as he could, but when two other jurors capitulated, he too
gave in and voted guilty."9 At that point, the jury was into its
second day of deliberations and faced a second night of
sequestration. 13
At a subsequent evidentiary hearing Vercler testified, as did
Barbara Harston, another member of the jury."' Vercler stated
that everyone knew who was voting guilty and who was not, and
the jury had thoroughly discussed the evidence." 2
He

119. Id.

120. Id.
121. 467 N.E.2d 1023, 1023 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 1035.
Id. at 1036.
Id.
Id.
Sale, 467 N.E.2d at 1036.
Id.
544 N.E.2d 715, 727 (Ill. 1989).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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When
unsuccessfully presented his theory to the other jurors.
two other jurors capitulated and voted guilty, he felt the pressure
of eleven other people and changed his own vote to guilty, even
though he maintained a reasonable doubt regarding the
defendant's guilt."3
However, juror Harston testified that when Vercler told the
jury members that he would go along with the rest of them and
vote guilty, the others encouraged him to re-examine the evidence
The court
to make sure that he was comfortable with his vote.'
held that the testimony of these jurors went to the mental
As a
processes of the jury and was therefore inadmissible."
7
result, the court affirmed the defendant's conviction."1
In contrast to the Illinois cases described, a number of federal
cases exemplify more extreme coercive conduct. Discussion of
these cases follows in the Section of this Article examining similar
matters from other jurisdictions.
Other cases illustrate confusion of the jury regarding issues of
jury instruction and use of jury verdict forms. In these cases,
courts did not find jury misconduct.
In Chalmers v.City of Chicago, the appellate court affirmed
the trial court's denial of plaintiffs motion for a new trial, but the
Illinois Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs petition for leave to
appeal."
Affidavits submitted by the plaintiff in support of the
post-trial motions stated that the jury intended to award damages
to the plaintiff for the nature, extent, and duration of her injury,
temporary disability, and pain and suffering. 13 9 However, the jury
erroneously placed the dollar figure in the punitive damages blank
because they believed that the blank was reserved for that
purpose. "" The court stated that these affidavits, if recognized,
would impeach and change the legal effect of the jury's verdict in
direct contravention of the rule established in Holmes.'4
Taylor v. R. D. Morgan and Associates, Ltd., a medical
malpractice case, presented a number of problems involving both
The
jury misconduct and confusion on the part of the jury.'
affidavits supporting plaintiffs post-trial motion claimed that the
jury misunderstood the instructions." Citing Chalmers, the court
declined to consider these allegations since "the authorities are in
133. Boclair, 544 N.E.2d at 727.
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135.
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137.
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139.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 728.
1982).
431 N.E.2d 361, 361 (Ill.
Id. at 362-63.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 365.
563 N.E.2d 1186, 1186 (11. App. Ct. 1990).
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accord that a party cannot use the testimony or affidavits of jurors
1
to show that the jury misunderstood the instructions or the law." "
Other portions of the affidavits in Taylor presented more
complicated issues centering on the alleged misconduct of one of
the jurors, Ronald Mann.' 5 The plaintiffs attorney challenged
juror Mann for cause during voir dire because the juror worked for
the Carbondale Medical Clinic and the plaintiff felt it biased the
juror in favor of the doctor. 1' It turned out that juror Mann also
knew one of the defendants that worked at the Carbondale
Clinic.' 7 In reaching its decision, the court noted that the plaintiff
did not prove that juror Mann failed to answer any questions that
the plaintiffs attorney asked him on voir dire or that he answered
any questions falsely.'" Most judges generally read a list of
witnesses to potential jurors during voir dire, and ask whether any
of the jurors know any of the people who have been named. The
opinion said nothing concerning whether this was done here, but
apparently the judge chose not to, since juror
Mann knew the
14
individual employed at the Carbondale Clinic.
Conflicting affidavits of different jurors stated that either a
conversation took place between juror Mann and the nurse at the
clinic, or that juror Mann "overheard" a conversation at the clinic,
depending on the affidavit the judge believed."' The conversation
consisted of discussion of how the plaintiffs life could not be
saved."' The jurors learned of this conversation either during or
after deliberations, depending on which affidavit the court
accepted."'
The appellate court held that while the circuit court did not
abuse its discretion in failing to grant a new trial, sufficient
evidence existed to warrant an evidentiary hearing on the issue.""
The court stated:
[t]he condition of the plaintiffs heel was hotly contested and was the
pivotal issue in the case; the alleged out-of-court statement directly
concerned this crucial matter. While we are aware of the difficulties
the jurors may face in attempting to recall events which occurred
years ago, and while we are reluctant to again interrupt the jurors'
lives and involve them in additional court proceedings, those
considerations do not outweigh the need to insure that the parties

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 1192-93.
Id. at 1193.
Id.
Taylor, 563 N.E.2d at 1193.
Id. at 1193-94.
Id. at 1194.
Id.
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received a trial untainted by bias or extraneous information.'
Accordingly, the appellate court vacated the judgment in favor of
the defendant and remanded the case to the trial court for an
evidentiary hearing.'55
Two similar cases are People v. Whitecotton' and Hall v.
The court refused to reverse the
National Freight, Inc."7
defendant's conviction in Whitecotton, holding that three juror
affidavits claiming a verdict reached due to fatigue could not be
considered, because the affidavits went to the mental processes of
the jurors.'5 In Hall, the court found juror affidavits relating
improper jury use of an "averaging technique" invalid to overturn
the verdict. 9
B. Extraneous Influences: Illinois Cases
The next category of cases involves situations where some
extraneous and potentially prejudicial information reaches the
jury and affects its verdict. Often, remarks of the trial judge or
bailiff are the source of the prejudice. Still other cases deal with
information alleging improper influence on jury deliberations.
Generally, courts have not considered cases involving
remarks of the trial judge to be so prejudicial as to warrant a new
trial. An exception is a 1950 case, Loucks v. Pierce,"° which does
not involve a remark, but rather conduct of a trial judge. In
Loucks, the administrator of plaintiffs estate sued the defendant
The jury
for injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident.'
returned a verdict for the defendant, and the judge sealed it, by
agreement of the parties, before he left the country. 162 Thereafter,
the plaintiff brought a motion for a new trial supported by
affidavits from counsel and one of the jurors claiming misconduct
during deliberations." No hearing occurred on the motion, and it
was "not clear whether the court ever saw or considered the
affidavit."'"
However, the judge apparently made a personal
investigation off the record, and "thereupon ordered a new trial
based upon alleged irregularities and a possible error in
instructions."" The appellate court reversed, with directions that

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 1194.
Id.
App. Ct. 1987).
514 N.E.2d 1160, 1160 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994).
636 N.E.2d 791, 791 (Ill.
Whitecotton, 514 N.E.2d at 1168-69.
Hall, 636 N.E.2d at 801.
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a.hearing be accorded the parties, on the motion for a new trial.'6 *
Another line of cases, dating from the 1960s, involves
remarks made to the jury by the trial judge. In People v.
Duszkewycz, the jury found the defendant guilty of forcible rape
and incest. 167 The defendant contended in his motion for a new
trial that certain statements made to the jury by the trial judge
resulted in a coerced verdict." The 16jury
had begun deliberations
9
on the morning of Thanksgiving Eve.
[Then,] about five o'clock in the afternoon, the Judge brought the
jury into open court and asked the foreman how the vote stood.
[The foreman] replied, '8-4, sir.' The Judge then asked, 'If I give you
another hour, do you think you will be able to reach a verdict? Do
you think so, in your judgment?' The answer was 'No, sir.' [The
Judge then] asked, 'Do you think it will take longer than one hour?'
... The Judge then said, 'Well, I will send you
70 back for one hour, six
o'clock. You see if you can't reach a verdict.
Shortly before 6:00 p.m., the judge again called the jury into
the courtroom and told them that dinner was ready and that
cigarettes were available.17' They ate dinner and continued their
deliberations. 72 Later that night after additional deliberations,
the duration of which is not reflected in the record, the jury
reached its verdict. 73 The defendant brought a motion for a new
trial, contending that the judge's remark coerced a verdict by
setting a time limit for jury deliberations. 7 4 The trial court denied
the motion for a new trial and the appellate court affirmed,
stating:
[t]he remarks should not have been made, yet it cannot be said that
they interfered with the deliberations of the jurors to the prejudice
of plaintiff in error or that they hastened the verdict. Nor can it be
said that the trial court set a time limit on the deliberations of the
jury. When the court stated, 'Well, I will send you back for one
hour, six o'clock. You see if you can't reach a verdict,' the jury did
not in fact reach a verdict by six o'clock.
At six o'clock they retired
175
for and then resumed deliberations.
In Hunter v. Smallwood, the court discussed the question of
whether Illinois' Rules of Civil Practice require that the judge
notify counsel and discuss with them any questions the jury may

166. Id. at 377.
167. 189 N.E.2d 299, 300 (Ill. 1963).
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
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Id. at 301.
Id.
Id.
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Id.
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have.17 In Hunter, the trial judge's affidavit. indicated that the
bailiff advised him twice during jury deliberations that the jury
wished clarification of the verdict forms, although the judge had
The
already given the jury instructions as to their use.'77
attorneys representing the parties, however, had departed from
the courthouse and the court "deemed it inappropriate or improper
to accede to such a request out of the presence of the attorney,"
and accordingly refused to answer the jury's question. 78 In his
motion for a new trial, the defendant contended that the court's
conduct violated the Civil Practice Act that stated, "[the court]
shall in no case, after instructions are given, clarify, modify, or in
otherwise than in writing,
any manner explain them to the jury,
" 179
unless the parties agree otherwise.
The defendant maintained that the statute meant the judge
could not communicate with the jury without first advising the
parties."8 The appellate court agreed, stating that the proper
interpretation of the statute permits oral communication with the
jury if the parties agree.18 However, to avoid reversible error, an
attempt to notify counsel must be made of any jury instruction in
order to eliminate the appearance of secrecy or prejudice. 8'
Nonetheless, Illinois courts most commonly hold that there
should be no communication between the trial court and the
deliberating jury other than in the presence, or with the
knowledge, of counsel, citing cases dating from 1860 to 1971.1m
Such communication outside of open court may become grounds
for reversal depending on the facts of each particular case. Courts
generally conclude that the trial court should, at the very least,
attempt to notify counsel of a jury request for clarification before
making any response. With regard to a trial court's obligation to
answer a jury question, it is within the sound discretion of the
trial court."
Courts also suggest that judges have the duty to further
instruct when the jury requests clarification, at least when the
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177.
178.
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328 N.E.2d 344, 346 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
Id.
Id.
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judge gives incomplete original instructions or when the jurors
indicate confusion."' This suggestion reflects a view that tends to
be somewhat different than the general practice in the trial courts,
that being "[w]here the jury [members] make their difficulties
explicit, the judge should clear them away with concrete accuracy;
and where the question asked is not clear, it is the duty of the
court to seek clarification."
In Hunter, the affidavit of one of the jurors indicated
confusion.'87 Following the rule in place in the years preceding
Holmes, the court categorically refused to consider any jury
affidavit." Nonetheless, the court decided that there were enough
indications of confusion on the part of the jury to warrant a new
trial. 89 The appellate court reversed the order of the trial court
denying a new trial and, therefore, remanded the cause."9
Other Illinois cases address issues raised by the judge's
polling of the jury and/or the Prim instruction.'
In People v.
Preston, the defendant's murder, armed robbery, and robbery trial
took "slightly less than two days." 9 ' Although the state called six
witnesses, the defendant neither testified nor called any
witnesses.'
The jury began deliberating in the late afternoon of
the second day.'1 At 11:00 p.m., the judge invited the attorneys to
his chambers and familiarized them with a supplemental
instruction he was going to give the jury regarding deadlock. 9
Since the jury gave no indication of their deadlock, the defendant
objected to the issuance of the instruction as "premature" and also
to specific portions of the instruction!" Individual members of the
jury were then called in and the following conversation occurred.
The Court: ...Ladies and Gentlemen, have you been able to reach a
verdict?
The Foreman: Not completely, your Honor.
185. People v. Kucala, 288 N.E.2d 622, 626-27 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1972); People v.
Harmon, 244 N.E.2d 358, 361 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1968).
186. Hunter, 328 N.E.2d at 348-49 (quoting 23A C.J.S. CRIMINAL LAW § 1376
(1989)).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 349.
191. See People v. Prim, 289 N.E.2d 601, 610 (Ill.
1972) (instructing the jury
that "it is your duty to decide the case if you can conscientiously do so). The
court in Prim held that these instructions were not coercive and did not
interfere with the deliberations of the jurors to the prejudice of the defendant.
Id.
192. 391 N.E.2d 359, 361 (Ill. 1979).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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The Court: Do you think you can arrive at a verdict?
The Foreman: I couldn't tell you at this moment, sir ....

197

The Illinois Supreme Court then gave its own modified Prim
instruction advising the jury:
Okay. I'm going to send you back. I just want to let you know that
in a large proportion of the cases absolute certainty cannot be
expected.
Although the verdict must be the verdict of each
individual juror and not a mere acquiescence of the conclusion of
others; yet you should examine the questions submitted with proper
regard and deference to the opinions of each other and you should
listen to each other's opinions with a disposition to be convinced. It
is your duty to decide the case if you can conscientiously do so. If
you fail to agree on a verdict, the case must be retried and a future
jury must be selected in the same manner and from the same source
as you have been chosen and there is no reason to believe that the
case would not be submitted to twelve men and women more
competent to decide, nor can a case be tried any better or more
exhaustively than it has been here, or that any more clear evidence
could be produced on behalf of either side. Now you can retire and
reconsider the verdict in this case.' 98

The judge subsequently retired to chambers and informed
counsel that he intended to call the jury out each hour and ask if

they could reach a decision.'" At this point the defendant moved
for a mistrial, which was denied.2 °0 At 12:50 a.m., the defendant
again moved for a mistrial and a directed finding, stating that the
length of time the jury had been out indicated a reasonable doubt
as to his guilt.201 The judge denied both of these motions and the
jury was recalled.2 2 After the jury reached its verdict, the foreman
told the judge; but on examination of the verdict forms, the court
apparently realized that the jury reached a verdict on only one of
three charges. 22 The court did not specify on which charge the
verdict was reached, but merely sent the jury back for further
deliberations 1 ' At
1:50 a.m., the jury reached guilty verdicts on
2°
all three charges.
When the judge polled the jury, one juror gave a curious
answer to the traditional question, "[wias this and is this now your
verdict?"2 °6 The juror responded, "[c]ompromise." °7 After the rest

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Preston, 391 N.E.2d at 361.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Preston, 391 N.E.2d at 361.
Id.
Id. at 362.
Id.
Id.

The John Marshall Law Review

[33:145

of the jury was polled, the court questioned that juror further, and
the following colloquy took place.
The Court: Juror Gross, you were asked by the clerk if the verdict
when you signed this was your verdict and is it still your verdict.
What is your answer to that?
Juror Gross: Compromise ....
Mr. Mikula (counsel for defendant): Judge ....
Court: Wait a minute. Is this your verdict?
Gross: Yes.
Court: Is it still your verdict as of right now?
Juror Gross: Yes.08
On appeal, the defendant contended that the lower court had
prematurely given the Prim instruction, since the jury never
indicated they faced a deadlock. 2" The supreme court rejected that
contention, stating that "no fixed time can be prescribed" for the
instruction and "great latitude must be accorded
to the trial court
210
in the exercise of its informed discretion."
The court also rejected the defendant's second argument that
the trial court's Prim instruction was improper, as it stated that "if
no verdict were reached a new trial would be necessary," a
statement of which Prim disapproves.2 1
While the court
acknowledged that the trial court's version was erroneous, it was
harmless "where the jury had been deliberating for approximately
six hours prior to hearing the instruction, and continued to
deliberate for 2three
hours thereafter," and as such, no reversible
1
error occurred.
The defendant finally argued that the trial court's questioning
intimidated the juror."' With regard to juror Gross' unresponsive
answer of "compromise," the Illinois Supreme Court stated that
the trial court gave the juror ample opportunity to repudiate her
recorded verdict if she so desired."4 The supreme court also found
that no basis existed in the record to conclude that the trial court
intimidated the juror by its question.2" The court affirmed the
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judgment of the circuit court denying the defendant's motion for a
new trial.1 6
People v. Green involved numerous allegations of misconduct
on the part of the trial judge."' After a jury trial, the jury found
the defendant, John Green, guilty of burglary.218 The defendant's
motion for a new trial alleged that the judge: 1) improperly asked
the jury foreman to reveal the numerical division of the jury
during deliberations; 2) gave a prejudicially inaccurate version of
Prim because he left out the words "without violence to individual
judgment;" and 3) refused to declare a mistrial although after
eleven hours of deliberation, ten jurors revealed that additional
deliberation would not result in a verdict. 19 While acknowledging
that some of the judge's remarks were erroneous, the reviewing
court held that none were serious enough to require reversal.220
Several other Illinois cases have claimed extraneous
influences and information as sources of prejudice. In People v.
Tucker, the defendant argued in his post-trial motion that the jury
had learned improper information.221
The defense lawyer's
secretary heard one of the jurors state "that it was a shame that
the jury had to convict the defendant, but in light of his prior
[convictions] they had to."22 2 Written statements from other jurors
showed that several members of the jury speculated about the
defendant's possible previous convictions.2
The defendant
maintained that the jury's speculation, along with juror Stadel's
certain knowledge of the defendant's prior arrest and conviction,
showed that Stadel shared his knowledge of the convictions with
the jury. 2'
However, at an evidentiary hearing, five other
subpoenaed jurors confirmed that Stadel did not share her
knowledge of the defendant's convictions with the rest of the
jury.'
The five other jurors also testified that they had no
knowledge of the defendant's prior arrests or convictions for DUI
when they convicted him. 226 The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion, stating that the record did not
support the argument that juror Stadel had informed her fellow
jurors of the defendant's history of DUI. 27
The court in People v.Reid reached a somewhat surprising
216. Id.
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result."
In that case, the jury found the defendant guilty of
murder and armed robbery." The record showed that the jury's
deliberations began on a Thursday.3 0 Late that evening, the court
sequestered the jury for the night in a local motel.2"1 The next day,
Friday, after deliberating until 7:00 p.m., the jury returned a
verdict of guilty on both counts." 2
According to the reported case,
six days after the sentencing hearing, the defendant filed a motion
for a new trial alleging that one of the jurors, Kent Bullock, received
an anonymous telephone threat during the jury's sequestered night
at the motel [on Thursday evening]. At a hearing on defendant's
motion, Bullock testified that when the jury [left for the motel]
Thursday evening, it was deadlocked 11-1 in favor of conviction on
the armed robbery count. Bullock further testified that during the
bus ride to the motel, the jurors attempted to figure out who the
hold-out juror was and [Bullock] admitted to another juror that [it
was he who] had voted against conviction.2 3
At the motel, Bullock had a room to himself.' After he had been
in the room for some time, he received a "hang-up" phone call.'
Two hours later, Bullock answered the telephone, and a male voice
he did not recognize responded, exclaiming, "[y]ou son of a bitch,
we'll get you for that."2 " Bullock did not report the telephone call
to anyone.2"
The following morning, Bullock changed his vote from
acquittal to guilty on the armed robbery count after approximately
three hours of deliberation.2"
During the deliberations on the
murder charge that followed, Bullock stated that nine jurors,
including himself, favored acquittal on the first vote. 9 By later in
the day, the number of jurors in favor of acquittal had dwindled to
three.' At around 6:00 p.m., with the judge waiting to see them,
the jurors took one last unanimous vote for conviction on the
murder charge."3
Bullock did not testify that he believed the
threatening phone call was related to his earlier position as the
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only juror who had voted guilty. 242 He also stated that he did not
change his vote on the murder count because of the call.'
However, responding to a question from the court, Bullock stated
that because of the call he was fearful about his vote and that he
did not want to spend the weekend at the motel.'
His fear and
desire not to return to the motel where he had received the call
influenced his decision to change his vote.245
The state's attorney's cross examination of Bullock revealed
that he belonged to the same church congregation as the
defendant's mother, which had collected money to assist the
defendant's family.24
Moreover, "[o]ut of respect for the
defendant's mother," Bullock even attended the sentencing.247
Further, a motel maintenance person testified that while he had
no personal knowledge regarding the evening Bullock received the
call, motel policy dictated that when the motel sequestered jurors,
the staff must disconnect the telephones to those rooms.'
The defendant's motion for a new trial could not state with
certainty that Bullock's motel telephone had been disconnected. 2 9
The court thus held that Bullock's testimony was insufficient to
impeach the jury's verdict.5 ° Intriguingly, the opinion makes no
comment on Bullock's tie to the defendant's family through his
church connection, or why this was not discovered in voir dire.25'
The appellate court affirmed the trial court but distinguished
this case from Remer v. United States, the case that the defendant
relied on in his motion.252 Stating that no Illinois cases were
directly on point, the appellate court relied on three cases from
other jurisdictions that it found "similar."2 2 In each of the three
cases, a juror physically or verbally threatened another juror, but
the courts found no prejudice.2
In United States v. Kohne, one
juror told a holdout juror that if the holdout juror did not agree, so
the jurors could go home, the juror would "be in court the next
morning for murder." 5 Similarly, in People v. Keenan, a male
juror threatened to kill an elderly female holdout juror. 256 Further,
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in People v. Jacobson, the court did not agree that by throwing a
chair one juror had coerced the verdict.'57 The court in Reid noted
that during the jury poll, each juror assented to his verdict in open
court.2m
The courts in Keenan, Kohne, and Jacobson also
259
mentioned jury polling as a factor in the failure to find prejudice.
Detailed discussion of these cases follows in the Section of this
Article dealing with cases from other jurisdictions.
People v. Whitehead also involved allegedly prejudicial
extraneous influence in which the jury convicted the defendant of
murder and aggravated kidnapping. 206 In a third amended petition
to the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant claimed a violation of
his Eighth Amendment right to an impartial jury for two
reasons.261 First, jurors were very angry because soon after their
selection, the local newspaper published their names and
addresses.262 Second, the jurors witnessed the mother of the victim
rise from the witness stand and shout at the defendant. 6 ' In
support of his motion, the defendant presented affidavits from two
jurors, as well as that of the clerk of the circuit court and a social
psychologist.26'
One juror stated in her affidavit that the jurors were
apprehensive about the publication of their names. 6 ' Further, two
jurors had complained to the clerk because "a person who might be
a murderer would have their names and addresses if he was set
free" two jurors complained to the clerk." An affidavit from the
clerk of the court confirmed that the jurors had made these
complaints. 267 The psychologist stated that with the publication of
the jurors' names, their privacy and anonymity, which ensures an
unbiased jury verdict, was lost.2' Finally, a second juror "stated
that while he was in the courtroom, he observed the victim's
mother arise, shout and cry towards the defendant," an allegation
reflected in the record. 69
The trial court denied the defendant's motion and the
reviewing court affirmed the denial.'2 °
The reviewing court

257. Id. (citing Jacobson, 440 N.Y.S.2d 458, 462 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981)).
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concluded that
[the] vital question to be determined was whether the jurors had
been influenced and prejudiced to such an extent that they would
not, or could not, be fair and impartial.... This determination
involved the court's consideration of all the facts and circumstances
and conjecture relating to the effect that the incompetent
information had upon the minds of the jurors, a determination
271
incapable of absolute accuracy or a very high degree of reliability.
The court noted that "jurors themselves are incapable
2 72 of knowing
the effect prejudicial information may have on them."
With regard to the mother's emotional outburst, the court
stated that it is well-settled that where a cautionary instruction is
given, no prejudice results.2 73 Therefore, the court needed to use
its "sound judicial discretion."27"
The court stated that the
mother's emotional outburst in Whitehead did not require a
mistrial. 75 In the Whitehead case, the court cautioned the jury to
disregard any comments that the witness made, and no prejudice
resulted.276
V. CASES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS
There are a number of interesting cases from other
jurisdictions that focus on various forms of juror misconduct and
related matters. Three cases, from California, Pennsylvania, and
New York respectively, are of particular interest to Illinois
practitioners because as recently as 1991, the First District
Appellate Court relied on them in deciding People v. Reid.277 In
Reid, despite the fact that a juror had allegedly been threatened
while sequestered in a criminal case, the First District Appellate
Court affirmed the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial. 278
In a California case, the defendant's motion for a new trial
alleged that a particular juror coerced the verdict. 79 Supporting
affidavits from a number of jurors indicated that one juror, a male,
had repeatedly threatened a holdout juror, an elderly woman. °
On at least one of these occasions, after he had shouted that he
would kill the woman, she began crying, shaking, and became
271. Id. at 1325 (citing People v. Hryciuk, 125 N.E.2d 61, 64 (Ill. 1954)).
272. Id.
273. Id. (citing People v. Howard, 588 N.E.2d 1044, 1044 (Ill. 1991); People v.
Hudson, 263 N.E.2d 473, 473 (Ill. 1970); People v. Bradley, 357 N.E.2d 696,
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274. Id. at 1326.
275. Whitehead, 662 N.E.2d at 1326.
276. Id.
277. 583 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ill. App. 1991). For further discussion of cases
analyzing juror misconduct, see supra Part IV.
278. Reid, 583 N.E.2d at 4.
279. People v. Keenan, 758 P.2d 1081, 1121 (Cal. 1988).
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physically ill." 1 While the offending juror apparently admitted
that he had indeed threatened the older juror, he refused to sign
what he termed a "confining affidavit.""'2 Nevertheless, he offered
to tell the whole story in open court.m
The trial court declined the juror's offer, refused to hold an
evidentiary hearing, and denied the defendant's motion, deciding
that this action was an improper investigation into the mental
processes of the jurors."s
The Supreme Court of California
affirmed, commenting that while the outburst described was
particularly harsh and inappropriate, it could not have been taken
literally by any reasonable juror.2 85 The juror merely expressed
frustration, temper and strong conviction against the contrary
views of another panelist. m The court reasoned
(that to inquire] as to the validity of the verdict based upon the
demeanor, eccentricities or personalities of the individual jurors
would deprive the jurors of the most inherent quality of free
expression.... Jurors may be expected to disagree during
deliberations, even at times in heated passion. 287
Similarly, in a Pennsylvania case, United States v. Kohne, the
defendant claimed that the trial judge erred when he denied the
defendant's motion for a mistrial based upon juror misconduct.m
The unsworn affidavit of juror Tisak supported the motion, which
alleged the other jurors coerced Tisak with threats of physical
harm because he held out, threats that he interpreted as
genuine.29 Tisak repeated incidents of hollering, yelling, and
abusive language directed at him during deliberations. m Another
juror had allegedly told Tisak that he "didn't get mad, he got
even." 1 After the court required a number of jurors to spend the
night on cots in a hotel, a juror commented that if he had to sleep
on a cot another night he would be "in Federal Court for
murder."2 2 At times, Tisak said, one juror placed his hands on the
back of Tisak's chair, flexed his muscles, and Tisak believed that
the other juror would break the chair over his head.2 3 However,
m
Tisak acknowledged that no one actually picked up a chair.2
281.
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Furthermore, he responded affirmatively during the poll and never
reported any of these incidents to the marshal or the judge."3 He
did not even mention the other jurors' conduct until five days after
the trial.2
Affirming the trial court ruling, the appellate court stated
that even assuming that the testimony of Tisak was credible, it
merely represented heated interchanges, common in the
juryroom." 7 Tisak's reasons for assenting to the verdict were
inadmissible pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)."8
Therefore, the district court correctly declined to vacate the
defendant's conviction.
A New York court relying on the Kohne decision also affirmed
a trial court's denial of a new trial in People v. Jacobson.' There,
the defendant brought a motion based on the following allegations:
intimidation of jurors through obscenities, slamming of fists, and
chair-throwing; refusal of the foreman to report to the court that
the jury was deadlocked; the action of a court officer who
interrupted deliberations on hearing a loud noise; and alleged
misuse of notes by one of the jurors.0 ° The court first stated that
consideration of any of the incidents violates Rule 606(b) of the
FederalRules of Evidence.3°1 However, even if the court considered
the incidents on their merits, the court stated that it would reach
the same conclusion: "[s]harp differences of opinion and use of
obscenities, although not to be encouraged, are a reality of life,"
and do not warrant vacating the verdict. 2 Likewise, the Court did
not regard the jury foreman's alleged refusal to issue a deadlock
note as grounds for a new trial. 3' The Court reasoned that the
jury actively requested testimony on the last day of deliberations,
and none of the jurors complained that further deliberations would
be futile."°
With regard to the chair-throwing incident, the Jacobson
court specifically relied on Kohne. °5 The court did not state
whether it believed a chair had actually been thrown, nor did it
consider the alleged incident."a It merely noted that the subjective
reasons a jury reaches a verdict are inadmissible. 7
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The defendant raised an additional allegation based on the
conduct of a court officer in response to the "chair throwing"
incident. 380 The defendant alleged that the court officer heard a
loud noise, and without the permission of the court entered the
jury room and told the jury to stop deliberating."
The officer
allowed the deliberations to begin again only after the jury
foreman assured the officer that no problem existed."' Although
the court agreed with the defendant that rarely might a jury be
interrupted during deliberations without permission of the court,
the judge concluded that the circumstances of this case made the
"prompt inquiry" of the officer proper.8 1 The court dismissed the
final allegation regarding the
improper use of notes by one of the
1 2
jurors, without explanation.
As earlier noted, the appellate court, in deciding Reid, found
the above cases to be "similar," but distinguished Remmer v.
United States, 3 3 relied on by the defendant to support his
motion.1 4 In Remmer, during the trial, an unnamed person had
remarked to the jury foreman that the foreman "could profit by
bringing in a verdict favorable to the defendant."
Following a
report by the juror, the presiding judge informed the prosecuting
attorney and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the
remarks, but did not inform the defendant or his counsel.316 At the
judge's request, the FBI investigated, determining that the remark
had been made "in jest."3 7 The trial continued and the jury
convicted the defendant. 8' On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court
concluded that the trial court should have conducted a hearing to
determine if the events actually prejudiced the defendant.1 '32 0 The
Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court below.
The court deemed the evidence of racial slurs sufficiently
prejudicial to cause reversal in United States v. Heller.32' The jury
convicted the defendant, Daniel Heller, of tax evasion and false
statements on his income tax returns.322 During the course of
deliberations, the trial judge received a note that prompted him to
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Voir
stop deliberations and voir dire each juror individually. 323
2
1
dire revealed facts that the court found "highly disturbing.,
One of the jurors told the judge that the trial had barely
started when somebody, in an effort at jocularity said, "[h]ey,
somebody asked me what kind of a case you were on."3 25 The juror
allegedly replied, "[w]ell, the fellow we are trying is a Jew, I say
'let's hang him.' 3 The reporting juror commented that he would
2
not want to be tried by anyone with that kind of mentality.1
There was another allegation made that the juror had contacted a
"reliable accountant" about some matters in the trial and shared
that with the rest of the jurors.23 The court of appeals reversed,
stating that it found the first allegation of error, involving racial
and religious slurs, compelling enough to require reversal without
reaching any other issues.32
Similarly, in United States v. Posner, a reviewing court
granted a new trial where jurors in a tax evasion trial learned of
the previous conviction of the defendant's former co-defendant
from the jury foreperson, who had read about the conviction in
newspaper accounts.330 After reviewing the testimony of all the
jurors, the reviewing court concluded that the jury's prejudicial
exposure to information required a new trial. 2 '
Two instances of juror misconduct led to a reversal of a
defendant's murder conviction in Marino v.Vasquez.23 First, one
juror used a dictionary to ascertain the definition of "malice."2 2
Second, a juror and a non-juror conducted an experiment with a
handgun to evaluate the defendant's theory of defense, and
reported the theory's implausibility back to the jury." The jury
deliberated for a long time prior to the experiment that led a
holdout juror to change his mind. 5
In contrast, in Tanner v. United States, the defendant sought
a new trial based on a juror's statement that several jurors
consumed alcohol at lunch throughout the trial, causing them to
sleep in the afternoon. 36 After the court denied that motion, the
court denied a subsequent motion supported by another juror's
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affidavit alleging widespread use of alcohol and drugs during the
trial.3 7 The court concluded that these affidavits violated Federal
Rule of Evidence 606(b)."
The U.S. Supreme Court's affirmance in Tanner is notable for
its comment on the public policy behind Federal Rule 606(b). The
Court explained that Rule 606(b) is supported by substantial
policy considerations, including the need to assure full and frank
discussion in the privacy of the jury room, to prevent the
harassment of jurors by losing parties, and to preserve the
"community's trust in a system that relies on the decisions of lay
people." 3 9
Petitioner's arguments that "substance abuse
constitutes an improper 'outside influence' about which jurors may
testify" under the rules was without merit in light of contrary
judicial interpretations of the common law rules, as well as Rule
606(b)'s plain language and legislative history' 0
A case from the Eastern District of Michigan is notable for its
eloquent discussion of the rationale for excluding the testimony or
affidavits of jurors and upholding Federal Rule 606(b). In United
States v. Schultz, after the jury convicted the defendant on drug
charges, he brought a motion for a new trial, alleging that one of
the jurors ingested sufficient amounts of a controlled substance to
render him unfit to perform his duties. 4'
The court began its analysis by noting that serious allegations
such as those presented by the Schultz case have implications
reaching far beyond any decision made in an individual case. 1 2 On
the other hand, compelling reasons exist for excluding testimony
by jurors about the process in order to preserve the secrecy and
finality of jury deliberations. 3 Characterizing the latter as the
"exclusionary principle," the court noted with approval that there
are, however
[v]alid and powerful reasons which support the exclusionary
principle. The Supreme Court long ago singled out two reasons as
being the most important. First, the exclusionary principle is
necessary to prevent jurors from being harassed and beset by the
defeated party in an effort to secure evidence of facts which might
establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. Second, the
exclusionary principle is necessary to prevent 'what was intended to
be private deliberation' from being made subject to constant public
scrutiny, 'to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of
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discussion and conference.'

Third, allowing unrestricted attacks by jurors upon their verdict
would so undermine the finality of their verdict as to threaten the
system itself; judges 'would become Penelopes, further engaged in
unraveling the webs they wove.' It is one thing to permit review on
the basis of the record, by post-trial motion and appeal; it is quite
another to extend review to the deliberative process of the jury.
Such extension would amount to a whole new dimension of scrutiny
which would of course finally reduce the measure of finality which
verdicts and judgments now achieve.3 "
Fourth, allowing unrestricted attacks by jurors upon their verdict
invites tampering with the process which would be difficult to
detect. A single juror who reluctantly joined in the verdict is likely
to be sympathetic to the overtures of defeated parties, and to be
persuaded to the view that his own consent rested upon false or
impermissible considerations; the truth will be hard to ascertain. In
the process, the trier itself will be tried, all at the behest of a
dissatisfied party aided by the second thoughts of a vaguely
uncomfortable juror. "
In another notable case, after the trial of Herring v.
Blankenship, the jury foreperson submitted an affidavit to the
trial court alleging that during the course of deliberations he had
been contacted and offered favors." 7 When later questioned by the
trial court, the juror pled the Fifth Amendment.'
Inexplicably,
the trial court then refused to conduct any further examination of
any other juror.3"
On a habeas petition, the district court
reversed, holding that the court should have conducted further
inquiries.m
They concluded the juror contact tainted the
defendant's conviction and remanded the case for further
proceedings.3"
Other instances of classic juror misconduct resulted in new
trials. In United States v. Gaffney, the jury admitted watching
television and reading newspaper accounts of the trial. 5 ' In
Jennings v. Oku, a reviewing court granted the defendant, murder
344. Id. (citing Christopher B. Mueller, Jurors'Impeachment of Verdicts and
Indictments in Federal Court Under Rule 606(b), 57 NEB. L. REV. 920, 923-24
(1978)).
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suspect Gary Lee Jennings, a new trial because the entire jury left
the room during their deliberations to conduct an experiment on
how the defendant's fingerprint appeared on the victim's car. 53
The magistrate noted that Jennings' fingerprint on the car door
was the most important evidence linking Jennings to the crime,
and the experiment created evidence so prejudicial that he
recommended habeas release."
The district court adopted the
recommendation and vacated the petitioner's conviction and
sentence. 55
In United States v.Resko, the court learned on the seventh
day of a nine-day trial that the jurors discussed the case among
themselves since the first day." In response, the court asked the
jurors by way of a questionnaire "whether they had discussed the
case with other jurors and if so, had they formed opinions on the
guilt or innocence of the defendant."357 Each juror admitted having
prematurely discussed the case; however, each juror also stated
they had not decided upon the defendant's guilt.3 8 Based on this,
the trial court denied the defendants' request for an individualized
voir dire of each juror and motion for mistrial.359 The trial
resumed, and the jury convicted the defendants of conspiracy to
distribute cocaine and heroin.
In reversing, the reviewing court stated that the "[lower]
court had erred by refusing to conduct a more searching inquiry
into the potential prejudice to defendants because of the jury's
misconduct." Ordinarily, the court noted,
[a] defendant must show that the error prejudiced him or her in
order to obtain a new trial.... However, because the two-part
questionnaire did not provide any significant information about the
nature or extent of the jurors' discussion, we fail to see how the
District Court could have made a reasonable determination [that no
prejudice occurred].36'
In a case such as this, where the court only discovers the jury
misconduct at mid-trial, and it is impossible for the judge to
determine whether the parties have been prejudiced, the court
acts properly when it vacates the convictions. 6'
The conduct of the judge and/or the bailiff has been the source
of alleged prejudice in other jurisdictions as well as in Illinois.
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Jones v. Kemp is one of those rare cases, federal or state, reversed
on the conduct of the trial judge."s
In the sentencing phase of
Kemp's trial, at the start of its deliberations, the trial judge
allowed a juror to take a Bible into the jury room." The district
court reversed, saying that "the search for the command of extrajudicial 'law' from any source other than the trial judge, no matter
how well-intentioned," violates of the Eighth Amendment
requirement that sentences be narrowly channeled
and
65
circumscribed by the secular law of the jurisdiction.
In United States v. Luffred, the reviewing court reversed the
defendant's conviction because the judge permitted the jury to
bring into its deliberating room a chart reflecting the government's
theory of the case that incorrectly reflected the evidence. 6 The
chart had never been admitted into evidence, but had been used as
a trial aid during the government's closing argument, and the
deliberating jury requested the trial aid.367 The court noted that
the jury obviously considered the chart important in light of their
request, and ruled it to be so prejudicial as to require a remand."
The reviewing court remanded Keller v. Petsock because of an
improper instruction by the bailiff. 69 A habeas petition contended
that a juror asked to see the judge during deliberations, but the
bailiff informed the juror that it would not be possible. 370 The court
decided that this presented grounds for an evidentiary hearing
and possible habeas release, and thus the case was remanded. 7'
A very recent and high profile case, United States v.
Symington, again involved the conduct of a trial judge who was
reversed when he dismissed a juror during deliberations.3 72 The
United States charged Symington, the former governor of Arizona,
with wire fraud and with making false statements to financial
institutions. 73 After several days of deliberations, the jury sent a
note to the judge alleging in substance that one of the jurors was
refusing to participate in their discussions. 74 Specifically, the
majority of jurors claimed that the woman appeared to be unable
to remain focused on the deliberations, was unable to recall topics
under discussion, and refused to discuss her views with the other
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jurors. 75 In the note, the jurors also expressed their frustrations
3
with her behaviorT.
"
The trial court responded by dismissing the
juror and replacing her with an
alternate. 77 The reconstituted
7
jury voted to convict Symington. 1
The Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court, implying that the
judge's action could validate an impermissible tendency on the
part of majority jurors to attempt to remove a holdout juror under
the guise of lack of participation. 71 Specifically, the Symington
court held that if the record disclosed any reasonable possibility
that the impetus for a dismissal request stemmed from the
minority juror's views on the merits of the case, the court could not
dismiss the juror.a Faced with this dilemma, therefore, the trial
court had but two choices: request that the jury continue
deliberations or declare a mistrial."'
Sometimes, the remarks of persons who might be considered
strangers to the trial are cause for a new trial. In Stockton v.
Virginia, while several jurors were having lunch at the Owl Diner
on the day they deliberated Stockton's sentence, the proprietor
approached the jurors and told them "they ought to fry the son-ofa-bitch." 2 The Fourth Circuit held that such a communication
denied the defendant his right to a fair and impartial jury."' The
appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment vacating
Stockton's death sentence and gave the State the choice of either
reducing his sentence to life imprisonment or re-sentencing him.'
VI. SOME PROBLEMS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW FOR JUDGES:
AN ANALYSIS
The widely divergent results reflected in the case law from
Illinois and other jurisdictions demonstrate the difficulty a judge
faces in applying the law to specific cases. The most apparent
problem is whether to caution or instruct the jurors at the outset
in more than the very general manner which judges tend to do at
the beginning of a trial.
Having granted a new trial on two different occasions because
of juror misconduct, this Author has taken to instructing the jury
more thoroughly than had been done in the past. In addition to
telling the jurors that they must decide the case only on the
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evidence presented in court, and they are not to discuss the case
with anyone until deliberation, jurors should be cautioned about
the three most flagrant and commonly encountered types of juror
misconduct. In short, jurors should be warned not to visit the
scene unless authorized to do so; not to conduct any private
investigations of evidence presented at trial or any other evidence,
specifically not with their computers; and not to consult any
reference materials such as dictionaries, almanacs, or "Rules of
the Road-type" booklets. They must simply decide the case on the
evidence that is presented in open court where ample opportunity
exists for either side to confront and/or refute the evidence.
A second area of concern arises out of an Illinois decision,
People v. Szymanski."
Recall that in Szymanski, the jury
foreperson lived in or near the town of Naperville and drew a map
of the area, which was used in deliberations.'
The trial court
reached the conclusion that the map simply arose out of the
"common experience" of the juror, and the appellate court
affirmed. 87 The question then arises: how broad is a juror's
"common experience" in the affairs of life, and how may this
experience be applied to the evidence presented at trial without
becoming "new" evidence? Jurors today are in general more
sophisticated and better educated than in previous years.
Computers, for example, are part of a child's education from
grammar school forward. Is computer literacy part of a juror's
"common experience," and how may that skill be applied to the
evidence? Can a juror subject an item of evidence to a computer
program, using a computer dictionary that the other side has no
opportunity to challenge? Is this simply doing with the computer
what the person would do mentally, but faster? When this type of
juror investigation occurs, is reversal required?'
Moreover, the common experience of jurors is as broad as the
walks of life from which these people come. Persons with special
areas of expertise have long served as jurors, particularly in large
metropolitan areas. What is the common experience of physicians,
nurses, engineers, physicists, etc.? Is theirs a body of knowledge
any different from the juror's familiarity with the area of
385. 589 N.E.2d 148 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).

386. Id. at 151.
387. Id. at 152.
388. See, e.g., Pavlou v. Rhanna, No. 94-L-5295, slip op. (Cir. Ct. of Cook
County, Law Div., June 30, 1998) affd. No.1-98-1496 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)
(describing a medical malpractice case in which the plaintiff alleged the
defendant doctor failed to diagnose breast cancer, and a juror created a
computer spreadsheet at home which tracked "doubling-time" of plaintiffs
tumor, an issue vital to the case). The juror concluded that defendant could
not be responsible for failing to diagnose the tumor at the time he examined
plaintiff. Id. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted a new trial.
Id. The appellate court affirmed without comment. Id.
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Naperville in Szymanski?389 A surgeon sitting on a medical
malpractice case does not have to be at the "scene of the surgery"
to draw on his or her special knowledge of surgical technique,
operating room procedure, and basic human anatomy. The same
is true for an aeronautical engineer serving on a case involving an
airplane crash, and so forth.
Persons with particularized knowledge of the evidence to be
presented in certain cases are often potential jurors. While
lawyers frequently make a great effort to exclude such people, it is
not always possible to do so. Are they candidates for a challenge
for cause, even though they protest that they can be fair? Since it
is not possible for the juror, counsel or the judge to know ahead of
time exactly how they will apply their specialized knowledge,
should they automatically be excluded? Many lawyers think so,
although judges generally defer to the good will of the juror who
says in voir dire that he or she can be fair.
A third area that presents major problems for a trial judge is
sorting out what is meant by the term "mental processes of the
jurors," evidence of which must be excluded pursuant to Holmes."'
Courts seem to interpret this rule in very different ways,
sometimes broadly, including any statement in the affidavits that
refer to the decision-making process, or even to the emotional or
physical state of the jurors. Thus, affidavits stating that a juror
was "crying and upset," "fatigued," or "confused" are, in most
cases, held inadmissible. These descriptions, however, appear to
refer more accurately to physical or emotional conditions easily
observable by other jurors, rather than to mental processes, even
though they may be the physical manifestations of the latter.3 91
The ever-changing definition of the term "prejudice," which
must be applied in deciding cases involving juror misconduct,
presents further difficulty. Some cases establish the standard of
probability of actual prejudice, stating that it would be an
impossible burden to establish definite prejudice.8 9 Other cases
caution that "mere suspicion of bias or prejudice is not
sufficient."393 The distinction between "probable prejudice" as
opposed to "mere suspicion of prejudice" is surely a fine one.
In addition, lawyers frequently present affidavits that violate
Holmes' prohibitions against delving into the mental processes of

389. Szymanski, 589 N.E.2d at 148.
390. People v. Holmes, 372 N.E.2d 656, 658 (1978).
391. Cf BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 889 (5th ed. 1979) (defining 'mental" as

[r]elating to or existing in the mind; intellectual, emotional").
392. See, e.g., Daniels v. Barker, 200 A. 410, 415 (N.H. 1938) (holding that
when incompetent evidence is received that may be prejudicial, the verdict
should be set aside).
393. See, e.g., People v. Porter, 489 N.E.2d 1329, 1337 (1986) (requiring that
the moving party have the burden of showing prejudice).
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jurors. Consequently, the judge is often in,,possession of a juror
affidavit stating that certain information actually influenced or
prejudiced his or her judgment. Nonetheless, the trial court must
disregard this information and substitute its own judgment for
that of the juror actively involved in the decision.
Obviously, little clear guidance exists in the case law from
any jurisdiction. In some cases, what appears to be very extreme
conduct is condoned by the trial judge and affirmed on appeal."
In other cases, seemingly mild infractions result in reversal.399
Finally, tension always exists between the need for judicial
economy and the preservation of the rights of fundamental
fairness. Judges are naturally somewhat invested in the concept
of judicial economy and have no desire to retry a case. While such
tension is theoretically to be resolved in favor of the right to a fair
trial, it is questionable whether that is always the case. A simple
concept is that individual judges must exercise fairness in their
own courtrooms and decide cases involving juror misconduct or
related matters on a case-by-case basis. A balance must exist
between respect for the historical concerns of protecting the
finality of a jury verdict reflected in Illinois law and law from
other jurisdictions, and a constitutional right to a fair trial.
CONCLUSION

No definite answers exist to most of these issues. However,
the more frequently the courts see the issue of juror misconduct in
motions for a new trial, the more the courts will clarify these
issues. A balance must develop between the need to discover
irregular conduct that may have tainted a verdict and the
avoidance of harassment of jurors once the trial is over. There is
an obvious danger of overzealous lawyers pursuing jurors, and an
even greater danger of a chilling effect on the willingness,
particularly of educated professionals, to serve as jurors in the
future. Courts will need to develop guidelines for approaching
jurors after a trial is over; these guidelines will emerge if the
problem continues to grow. In the meantime, judges will simply
have to rely on the guidance of the courts above, as well as their
own common sense, in making these decisions.

394. See, e.g., United States v. Kohne, 358 F. Supp. 1046, 1049 (1973)
(describing a case in which the life of a holdout juror was threatened by
another juror); People v. Jacobson, 440 N.Y.S.2d 458, 468 (1987) (refusing to
reverse the trial court where juror threw a chair at another juror).

395. See U.S. v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 69.0 (3d Cir. 1993) (determining the trial
court has discretion when a jury discusses the evidence prior to deliberation).

